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This study is published within a 
series of policy briefs on Europe 
and its neighbours in the east and 
south. In this series we publish pa-
pers commissioned or produced by 
the Bertelsmann  Stiftung in coop-
eration with regional partners in the 
framework of our work in this field 
This policy brief is the product of the 
 Bertelsmann Stiftung’s cooperation 
with the Warsaw-based  Institute of 
Public Affairs (ISP).
The Russian intervention in Ukraine 
has provoked a deep crisis which 
will likely last for years, with pro­
found consequences not only 
for Ukraine, Russia and Eastern 
 Europe, but also for the internal 
situation in the European Union. 
The current Russian aggression is 
frequently seen as a profound vio­
lation of international law, breaking 
the rules that are fundamental for 
relations in Europe. It is perceived 
as perhaps a step towards rebuil­
ding imperial Russia or, at the very 
least, an attempt to keep Ukraine 
within Russia’s sphere of influence. 
However, one very important as­
pect is virtually neglected, namely, 
that Russia’s Ukraine venture may 
have a significant impact on the fu­
ture of liberal democracy in Europe 
and beyond. 
It seems that the so­called “modern 
authoritarianisms,” Russia among 
them, have become significantly 
more attractive to many countries 
and political parties in Europe and 
around the world than they were 
just two decades ago after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. In its report 
Freedom in the world 2014, Free­
dom House notes, “For the eighth 
consecutive year, Freedom in the 
World recorded more declines in 
democracy worldwide than gains.”1 
The Bertelsmann Stiftung in its 
Transformation Index (BTI) 2014, 
which analyses and evaluates the 
quality of democracy, market eco­
nomy and political management in 
128 developing and transition coun­
tries, issued a “no positive transfor­
mation scorecard.”2 Russia is cer­
tainly one of the key players in this 
negative process, not only because 
of its domestic policy, which is be­
coming more and more autocratic, 
but also due to its foreign policy.
Against Russia’s veto
In liberal democracies the free 
choice of international partners 
and alliances is a fundamental 
right for every country. Russia has 
broken this right in the case of 
Ukraine because it has stood firmly 
against Ukraine’s closer coopera­
tion and integration with the West. It 
has often been stressed that  Russia 
is solely against Ukraine’s potential 
membership in NATO. However, 
1 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom­
world/freedom­world­2014#.VBYDe1eHiuo.
2 http://www.bti­project.org/reports/global­
findings/.
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Moscow has all along been against 
Kyiv’s association with the EU. 
Evidence of this is that Russian 
authorities have threate ned to use 
protectionist measures in trade with 
Ukraine, if Kyiv implements the eco­
nomic provisions of the Association 
Agreement between Ukraine and 
the EU, signed in June 2014, and 
ratified by the  European and Ukrain­
ian Parliaments in  September 2014.3
The Russian political elite consi ders 
Ukraine to lie within  Russia’s sphere 
of influence and vital interests which 
the West cannot deny them. Putin 
sees Ukraine more as a territory 
than as a state.4 The change of au­
thorities in Kyiv in  February 2014 
was seen by Putin and his inner 
circle as a challenge to the status 
quo that was planned, prepared and 
implemented by the US. The past 
months have shown that  Russia is 
doing and will do all that is possible 
to keep Ukraine within its sphere 
of influence. Russia’s determina­
tion and readiness to achieve this 
goal by defying the conventions of 
international law through actions 
such as the annexation of Crimea 
and military intervention in Eastern 
Ukraine is very high. Ironically, the 
Russian ruling elite (in a strange 
twist of reality) portrays itself in the 
role of the victim rather than the 
aggressor.5 Russia has been try­
ing to depict itself as a defender of 
so­called traditional values, culture 
and religion, which, according to 
 Moscow, are similar or even the 
same for Russians and Ukrainians 
– a bastion against the decadent and 
aggressive West. All of this practi­
cally means that Russia is against 
Ukraine’s becoming a well­function­
ing libe ral democracy.
The position of the EU and the US, 
that Russia does not have the right 
3 Russia regards the delay of the implementa­
tion of the agreement until December next 
year as a victory and on 16 September 2014 
repeated its threat to impose trade penalties 
against Kiev as soon as the deal enters into 
force. Financial Times. Sep 16, 2014, http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1051b562­3d8b­11e4­
8797­00144feabdc0.html#axzz3DZFMFblp.
4 See, for instance, Putin’s Sep 4, 2013 
interview with the Russian state broadcaster 
Channel One ­ http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=AAxjVjmLjrk, commentated by 
Alexander J. Motyl ­ “Putin refers to Ukraine 
as a ‘krai’—purposely avoiding the Russian 
word for country, ‘strana.’ I’ve translated it as 
‘land’ — which is the way it frequently appears 
in patriotic Russian verse or songs — while the 
translator prefers ‘territory,’ which, while more 
prosaic, also conveys the non­state quality of 
Ukraine. Either way, Putin comes across as 
believing that Ukraine is just a place, populated 
by people who resemble Russians, and not an 
independent state with a national identity of its 
own.” http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/
alexander­j­motyl/deconstructing­putin­ukraine.
5 See, for instance, Sergey Karaganov’s com­
ment: “Westerners need to understand how 
their governments made a potential foe out of 
what was once an aspiring ally. Russia will not 
yield. This has become a matter of our nation’s 
life and death.” Sergey Karaganov, “Western 
delusions triggered conflict and Russians will 
not yield, ”Financial Times 14.08.2014, http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/05770494­3a93­11e4­
bd08­00144feabdc0.html#axzz3DOO0cfoN. 
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as has been made clear publicly 
many times. Therefore, the West’s 
toolbox is limited to economic pres­
sure, first of all sanctions, which by 
definition do not have an immedi­
ate impact. As mentioned above, 
 Russia’s readiness to act is pro­
foundly different in nature. Therefore, 
Russia’s position in the short­term 
is stronger than the EU’s position 
since Russia is willing to use tools 
such as military aggression and 
the annexation of a neighbouring 
country’s territory. Therefore, tacti­
cally, Russia is a step ahead of the 
EU and the US. On the other hand, 
strategically, the situation is much 
worse for Moscow – the EU and the 
US are not in a losing position.
First of all there is an enormous dif­
ference in the economic potentials of 
Russia and the West (EU and US). 
Russia cannot withstand long­term 
economic pressure. The situation 
can be seen as, at least to some 
extent, similar to the last decade 
of the  Soviet Union, marked by the 
 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. 
Sanctions, together with lower prices 
of crude oil, could have a damaging 
impact on the  Russian economy in 
the medium­term perspective, possi­
bly even within one or two years. The 
Kremlin is aware that this scenario 
can materialise. This understanding 
provokes growing irritation in Mos­
cow as they didn’t think that EU and 
US reaction would be so resolute 
and subsequent waves of sanctions 
would be introduced.
to veto Ukraine’s aspirations and 
cannot impose its political system on 
its neighbours, surprised the Krem­
lin. The Russian ruling elite wrongly 
assessed the situation in two crucial 
aspects. Firstly, they underestimated 
Ukraine’s  ability to resist. It seems 
that this was because Putin and his 
colleagues saw Ukraine as an artifi­
cial state. In the spring of 2014, they 
thought that they would be able to 
provoke huge political protests in all 
the regions of Eastern and South­
ern Ukraine – from Kharkiv through 
Donbas, Kherson and Mykolaiv to 
Odessa – protests which would de­
stroy Ukraine. They tried to do it, but 
it didn’t work out as planned. The 
protests were too feeble and ended 
quickly. Therefore, they instigated 
the war in  Donbas. Secondly, they 
thought that the West, particularly 
the EU, was weak, incoherent and 
not prepared to act against Russia. 
Probably the Kremlin was certain 
that the situation would be similar 
to the situation after the Russian­
Georgian war in 2008, and that the 
West would acquiesce to Russia’s 
actions. The successive waves of 
sanctions imposed by the EU, the 
US and other countries came as an 
unpleasant surprise to the Russian 
ruling elite.
Does the Western response 
matter?
The US and the EU have imposed 
limits to their actions. Military en­
gagement is out of the question, 
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the choices of the Ukrainian society; 
the EU’s role in the neighbourhood; 
and, last but not least, Russia’s at­
tractiveness in the EU.
The choices of the Ukrainian 
society 
The Euromaidan was a public ex­
pression of ordinary Ukrainians who 
decided to oppose the authorita rian 
regime of Viktor Yanukovich – a 
state where corruption and nepo­
tism infiltrated the judicial system, 
business relations, public adminis­
tration and almost every aspect of 
everyday life.
Over the past twenty­five years 
Ukraine has been regularly witnes­ 
sing politically motivated massive 
protests. At the end of the Soviet 
era (1990), the Revolution on  Granite 
took place and ten years later, the 
Ukraine without Kuchma movement 
shook the country. In 2004 people 
took to the streets to question the 
legitimacy of the second­round presi­
dential elections, which sparked the 
so­called Orange Revolution6. Each 
of the mentioned protests can be per­
ceived as a step toward the rise of a 
modern nation in Ukraine, with the 
Euromaidan offering a clear sign that 
 Ukrainians want a state that is based 
The events of the last twelve 
months have shown that  Russia 
has lost its position vis­à­vis 
Ukraine. In autumn 2013, when 
the then president Viktor  Yanukovych 
decided to reject the Association 
Agreement with the EU and instead 
chose  Russian aid, Putin was al­
most certain that Ukraine would be 
in his hands for many years to come. 
The Euromaidan changed the situ­
ation dramatically and now Ukraine 
is closer to the West than ever be­
fore. One can say that it is a para ­ 
dox – Russia’s actions which were 
aimed at destruction of the links 
between Ukraine and the West bro­ 
ught the totally opposite effect.
Today, the main challenge for the 
EU and the US is how to oppose 
 Russia’s actions and assist Ukraine 
in the short term. Ukraine is in an 
extremely difficult economic situ­
ation. The recession will reach at 
least nine percent of GDP and prob­
ably even more. This can provoke 
social tensions during the coming 
winter and the next year as a whole. 
Therefore, well­prepared long­term 
therapy will not be sufficient. 
But a strong and decisive response 
against Russia’s intervention in 
Ukraine, both in the short­ and long­
term, should be seen in a broader 
perspective. One can say that this re­
sponse will play a very important role 
for the future of liberal demo cracy not 
only in Ukraine but also in other coun­
tries. Three issues seem to be crucial: 
6 For more, see: Gromadzki, Grzegorz and 
Wenerski, Łukasz. Society – the decisive player 
in Ukrainian politics? Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
February 2014. http://isp.org.pl/uploads/
pdf/625488679.pdf.
A 
ch
al
le
ng
e 
fo
r l
ib
er
al
 d
em
oc
ra
cy
 –
 
H
ow
 to
 u
nd
er
st
an
d 
th
e 
R
us
si
an
 in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
in
 U
kr
ai
ne
   
P
o l
ic
y 
B
rie
f
6
of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
(the CU). Just two month earlier in 
April, EU integration was preferred 
by 55% and the CU by 24%.8 Similar 
research conducted in February by 
Rating showed that EU association 
was supported by only 41%, while CU 
association was supported by only 
five percentage points less.9
These two factors – increasing sup­
port for EU integration and wide­
spread expectations of reform – 
should mobilise not only the EU, but 
also other Western countries that 
consider themselves to be liberal 
democracies to effectively support 
Ukraine in creating functioning demo­
cratic institutions and implementing 
the rule of law. Lack of such support 
for Ukrainians could have multidi­
mensional negative consequences, 
affecting not only Ukraine, but the 
entire region of Eastern  Europe. If 
left without strategic support from 
the West and unsuccessful in the 
process of reforms, Ukraine can lose 
faith in liberal democracy in the coun­
try. Results of opinion polls conducted 
in December 2013 and January 2014 
show that 51% of Ukrainians see de­
mocracy as the best political system, 
but 20% still prefer authoritarianism. 
In the event of problems with reforms, 
the latter percentage can quickly rise, 
since for 12% of the population the 
type of political system doesn’t mat­
ter – it simply has to be effective.10
on the rule of law and human rights 
instead of chronic corruption and the 
lawlessness of authorities. Socio­
logical research shows that today’s 
Ukrainians seem to be determined 
to demand profound changes in the 
country. According to opinion polls 
conducted in March 2014 by the Rat­
ing Sociological Group, two types of 
reforms are particularly desired – anti­
corruption (63%) and economic re­
forms (61%). Other important issues 
were reform of the army and defence 
(42%) and of health care (33%).7 
The events in Ukraine, i.e., the Eu­
romaidan protests and the ensuing 
conflict with Russia, have acted as a 
pro­EU factor that has united Ukrain­
ians in the idea of closer integration 
with the EU. The results of Rating 
Group research conducted in June 
and July show 61% of interviewed 
Ukrainians support EU integration 
of Ukraine, while only 20% prefer 
integration with the Customs Union 
7 Rating Sociological Group, Attitude to situa­
tion on the East, July 22, 2014 (date of publish­
ing) http://www.ratinggroup.com.ua/en/products/
politic/data/entry/14098/.
8 Ibid.
9 Rating Sociological Group, New IRI Ukraine 
Poll: April 2014, Apr 25, 2014 (date of pub­
lishing), http://www.ratinggroup.com.ua/en/
products/politic/data/entry/14091/ The question 
asked in February by Rating does not corre­
spond exactly with the other questions about 
the preferred geopolitical choices of Ukrain­
ians cited in the text. In this survey apart from 
the answers: “EU” or “Customs Union” or “It is 
hard to say”, respondents could also chose the 
response “other.”
10 www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/01/21/70 
10505/. 
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2014: “I am confident [in what] the 
European Union means for us, not 
just a kind of civilizational choice, 
but also the best instrument to mod­
ernise all our institutions, the best 
assistance, financial expertise but 
also pressure for us to fight against 
corruption, to reform the justice, to 
build accountable institutions...”11
These countries, similar to Ukraine, 
are also under Russian pressure 
and this pressure can be turned 
up in the near future. For instance, 
Moscow can try to destabilise the 
situation in Moldova before and/or 
after the upcoming parliamentary 
elections on 30 November 2014. 
These elections are of key impor­
tance for Moldova’s ability to draw 
closer to the EU in the coming 
months and years.
The actions of the EU and the West 
as a whole in the Russia­Ukraine 
conflict are being watched carefully 
by other East European countries 
participating in the Eastern Partner­
ship, namely Belarus, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. The EU’s performance 
can also have an impact on  Russian 
and Turkish society.
All these players, from Moldova to 
Turkey, are trying to assess whether 
the EU (and the West as a whole) 
At the same time, it should be 
strongly emphasised that even 
though the functioning of liberal 
democracy in Ukraine is not a 
foregone conclusion, there seems 
to be no going back to the authori­
tarian regime we saw before the 
Euromaidan or to the creation of a 
Russia­style authoritarian regime in 
Ukraine. The people of Ukraine will 
strongly oppose such attempts and 
resist again and again. Therefore, 
Ukraine, left to itself by the West 
and embraced by Russia, would be 
a long­term source of instability in 
the region.
The EU’s role in the neighbour-
hood
The EU’s performance will be a lit­
mus test for its position as a repre­
sentative of liberal democracy not 
only in Ukraine but in the EU neigh­
bourhood as a whole. The question 
is whether the Union will be suffi­
ciently active and effective in the 
Russia-Ukraine conflict and be able 
to efficiently support Ukraine in its 
efforts against Russia and assist 
in Ukraine’s transformation into a 
mature democracy.
This question is extremely impor­
tant for Moldova and Georgia which 
have signed Association Agree­
ments along with Ukraine. They 
have very high expectations, both 
their authorities and their societies. 
Moldova’s prime minister, Iurie Le­
anca, said in an interview in June 
11 http://www.france24.com/en/20140617­
interview­iurie­leanca­prime­minister­moldova­
eu­association­agreement­chisinau­transnistria­
putin­russia/ 
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metaphoric sense. Orban, simi­
larly to his counterparts from Rus­
sia, stands openly against liberal 
democracy, a view he proclaimed 
recently when addressing the 
Hungarian minority in Romania at 
the end of July 2014. During his 
speech, he stressed that Hungary 
is now undergoing the process of 
the construction of a state that will 
be an “illiberal or non­liberal” one.12 
Orban has also been considering 
“how systems that are not Western, 
not liberal, not liberal democracies 
and perhaps not even democra­
cies, can nevertheless make their 
nations successful.” Orban sees 
Russia, together with Singapore, 
China and Turkey, among these 
success stories.
The Hungarian prime minister 
seems to be drawing closer to the 
Russian authorities not only in his 
rhetoric, but also in practice. Bear­
ing in mind that Hungary still re­
mains a liberal democracy and that 
the scale of antidemocratic actions 
cannot be compared with the situa­
tion in Russia, examples of similar 
antidemocratic policies already do 
exist. The latest and most spectac­
ular is the attack of the Hungarian 
government on non­governmental 
organisations that are fully or par­
tially financed with funds from inter­
can be a real force against an au­
thoritarian regime. Ultimately, this 
is a very important test for the EU 
itself because it will show whether 
the EU is still a vibrant or already a 
waning power.
Russia’s attractiveness in the EU
Over the last few years, especially 
since the outbreak of the financial 
crisis in 2008, an intensive growth 
in the popularity of anti­liberal 
and eurosceptic parties has been 
witnessed within the EU. These 
parties confirmed their strength 
in the last elections to the Euro­
pean Parliament, winning seats 
for MEPs from such countries as 
the UK, France, Poland, Germany, 
Italy, Hungary, Greece, the Neth­
erlands and Finland. Apart from 
their euroscepticism, it is difficult to 
find another common denominator 
among these parties. Yet, there is 
another unifying element in a ma­
jority of these parties – a positive 
attitude towards Russia and its for­
eign policy.
Nevertheless, at this stage a real 
problem Europe has to face is 
the current policy of Viktor  Orban, 
prime minister of  Hungary. Unfor­
tunately, after four years in power 
with a constitutional majority in the 
parliament, the road of changes 
that Orban has chosen seems to 
be veering away from cooperation 
with the EU and instead leaning 
towards Russia in both a real and 
12 http://www.kormany.hu/en/the­prime­minister/
the­prime­minister­s­speeches/prime­minister­
viktor­orban­s­speech­at­the­25th­balvanyos­
summer­free­university­and­student­camp.
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Hungary is only the first example 
of a growing disinclination towards 
liberal democracy among EU 
member states. It is an especially 
important example now because its 
prime minister has the real power 
to replicate Russia’s way of govern­
ing in his own country. But followers 
of such policies are already wait­
ing in the wings for their chance 
to come. Far­right parties from all 
over Europe are becoming stronger 
and at the same time appear to be 
seduced by  Moscow.15 Leaders of 
these parties see Vladimir Putin 
symbolically – as a person who can 
sternly defend the national inter­
est of his own country and openly 
supports “traditional values” as op­
posed to “liberal disease.” Voices 
of support for him and for his poli­
cies can be heard from far­right 
and eurosceptic parties all across 
the Europe. Marine Le Pen, lead­
er of the National Front in France, 
stated recently that she has “a 
certain admiration for the man 
[Vladimir Putin]. He proposes a 
patriotic economic model, radically 
different than what the  Americans 
national donors. During his speech 
in  Romania last July, Viktor Orban 
directly stated that NGOs receiv­
ing money from abroad are not 
representatives of civil society but 
paid political activists who realise 
the political will of foreign interest 
groups. To deal with such “political 
activists” the prime minister of Hun­
gary has decided to use methods 
that are very well known in Russia, 
i.e., organised raids on the offices 
of such organisations and thorough 
investigations of their activities.13
Viktor Orban is not only trying to 
implement mechanisms of inter­
nal policy in Hungary following the 
Russian example, but he is also 
moving vectors of his foreign policy 
closer to Russia. Recently the Hun­
garian parliament, controlled by Or­
ban’s party “Fidesz,” has approved 
a 10 billion EUR loan from Russia 
to expand the Paks nuclear power 
station.14 The Hungarian policy of 
shaping closer ties with Moscow 
also includes its reluctance to­
wards the EU sanctions imposed 
on  Russia.
13 On Sep 8, 2014 police raided two Hungarian 
NGOs responsible for distributing Norwegian 
grants. A dozen civil society organisations had 
been besmirched earlier this year. http://www.
economist.com/news/international/21616969­
more-and-more-autocrats-are-stifling-criticism-
barring­non­governmental­organisations
14 http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/
afp/140623/hungary­approves­10­billion­euro­
russia­loan­nuclear­upgrade­0
15 Of course not only European far­right parties 
have been seduced by Moscow. The same 
might be said about many far­left parties. An 
example is the recent vote in the European 
Parliament on ratification of the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement. MEPs from the Euro­
pean United Left/Nordic Green Left – a political 
grouping of European far­left and communist 
parties – voted almost unanimously against the 
Agreement with Ukraine.
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the European Parliament, we could 
be witnes ses to a political experi­
ment that could bring very negative 
consequences, not only to the coun­
try involved, but also to the entire EU. 
Conclusions and recommenda-
tions
The issues analysed above dem­
onstrate that Russia’s intervention 
in Ukraine can also be seen as a 
manifestation of the rivalry between 
liberal democracy and modern au­
thoritarianism. The final result of 
this competition is still unknown. 
In the case of Ukraine, Russia still 
has many tools at its disposal (eco­
nomic pressure, among others) to 
throw roadblocks, at least tempo­
rarily, in Kyiv’s path towards the 
West. Therefore, the EU should be 
prepared for a prolonged crisis in 
its relations with Russia. One can 
say that this situation will last until 
the end of the Putin era. The EU’s 
readiness to assist Ukraine on its 
way towards becoming a mature 
democracy should be made one 
hundred percent clear, leaving no 
room for the smallest doubt. Putin 
and his circle should know that re­
garding this issue there is no room 
for manoeuvre.
It should be strongly emphasised 
that in the longer term, only a ma­
ture, democratic Ukraine can pro­
vide stability in an important part 
of Eastern Europe which borders 
the EU. A democratic and thriving 
are imposing on us.”16 In Austria 
Heinz­Christian Strache, who leads 
the Freedom Party of Austria, con­
firmed that from his point of view 
Putin is a pure democrat.17 Nigel 
Farage of the British UKIP party has 
also declared his admiration for the 
president of Russia.18 Another exam­ 
ple is Matteo Salvini, leader of the 
far­right Italian party Lega Nord, 
who publicly commented on the so 
called Crimea referendum: “Viva the 
referendum in Crimea! Viva the free 
choice of the people!”19 
Leaders of far right parties usually 
have a distaste for liberal demo­ 
cracy and certainly admire Vladimir 
Putin. In the event that any of these 
parties win elections in their own 
countries, not only in the elections to 
16 This opinion was presented in an inter­
view Marine Le Pen gave to Le Monde in 
September. http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/
article/2014/09/05/marine­le­pen­il­faut­revenir­
au­peuple_4482554_823448.html; In April this 
year she paid an official  visit to Moscow. Dur­
ing a meeting with Sergei Naryshkin, speaker 
of the Russian state Duma, she condemned 
the  European Union for declaring Cold War on 
 Russia ­ http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2014/04/12/us­ukraine­crisis­le­pen­russia­
idUSBREA3B09I20140412.
17 http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117692/
fascism­returns­ukraine. 
18 After the MH17 crash in Ukraine, Nigel 
Farage decided to revise his views. See more: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
vladimir­putin/10979362/MH17­Vladimir­Putin­
is­callous­Nigel­Farage­says.html
19 http://www.businessinsider.com/paul­ames­
europes­far­right­is­embracing­putin­2014­4.
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only takes seriously a state or power 
that has clear goals and an interest 
in its own policies. Therefore, the 
EU’s policy in response to Russia’s 
actions in Ukraine cannot be shifted 
before Moscow completely stops its 
interference in Ukraine. It should be 
understood that the EU sanctions will 
be imposed for a long time – not for 
months, but for years.
It is almost certain that Russia will 
try to provoke misunderstandings 
between EU member states which 
could lead to a split within the Un­
ion. Moscow could exert pressure 
on several member states which are 
particularly vulnerable (the depend­
ence on Russian gas supplies for in­
stance). Therefore, solidarity among 
member states is crucial.
However, a smart EU policy towards 
Russia is obviously not enough 
to achieve the main goal, name­
ly, a democratic and prosperous 
Ukraine. The EU has to seriously 
assist Ukraine in its modernisation 
efforts, including the building of a 
state of rule of law without perva­
sive corruption. EU assistance must 
be conditional and the Union has 
to require real reforms from Ukrain­
ian government. It is a tricky issue 
now due to the Russian aggression. 
While the intervention cannot be an 
excuse for the Ukrainian authorities 
to postpone reforms, the EU should 
understand the difficulties that offi­
cial Kyiv faces. This means that EU 
policy towards Ukraine should be a 
Ukraine would be an important exam­ 
ple, probably decisive, for other 
Eastern European countries and 
their societies, including Russia, 
which are autocratic now and may 
in the future seek their own way to 
democracy. Therefore, the contain­
ment of Russia’s efforts to subordi­
nate Ukraine is in the vital interest 
of the EU. However, it is true that 
in the short­ and maybe also the 
medium­term, Ukraine’s attempts to 
transform into a liberal democracy 
cooperating closely with the EU 
and US will provoke very serious 
tensions between the EU and the 
West as a whole, on the one hand, 
and Russia, on the other. Neverthe­
less EU policy should be strategi­
cally oriented towards the long­term 
goal, namely a democratic Ukraine, 
and at the same time should try to 
minimise short­term tensions with 
Russia – a task which will be, to be 
frank, extremely difficult and almost 
impossible to implement.
EU policy towards Russia should be 
consistent and unwavering. It cannot 
be changed on the account of the op­
portunistic position of some member 
states who would like to return to a 
policy of “business as usual” with 
Moscow and already are not in fa­
vour of economic sanctions against 
 Russia. Even the smallest signals of 
internal quarrels in the EU concern­
ing relations with Russia are seen in 
Moscow as proof of the inability of the 
EU to be a serious player. It should 
be noted that the Russian ruling elite 
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balanced mixture of understanding 
and conditions. It seems that at least 
a part of Ukrainian society can sup­
port such a policy because they are 
interested in the swift change of their 
country to a state respecting rule of 
law. However, under the current cir­
cumstances, the EU should offer a 
carrot to ordinary Ukrainians. A visa­
free regime could be such a carrot. 
It would be clear proof for Ukrainian 
society that the EU is indeed willing 
to cooperate closer with Ukraine. 
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine 
should be also seen in the re­
gional perspective. Therefore, 
the EU should consider not only 
Ukraine, but also the other East­
ern  European countries, espe­
cially those which have signed 
Association Agreements with the 
EU, namely, Moldova and Geor­
gia. They can be the next targets 
of Russia’s negative actions. The 
conclusions and recommendations 
presented above show that a com­
plex and extremely smart policy is 
needed from the EU side. It should 
be strongly stressed, however, that 
the EU is not helpless – on the con­
trary, in long term, it holds a much 
stronger hand than Russia.
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